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"In Behalf of the Science of the Country": The Smithsonian and
the U.S. Navy in the North Pacific in the 1850s1
MARC ROTHENBERG2
ABSTRACT: During the early l850s, the United States launched two major
expeditions to the Pacific, as well as a series of surveys of the American West.
Although the U.S. Army had developed a strong symbiotic relationship with
the civilian scientific community, the U.S. Navy was still attempting to define
its role in American science. This paper compares and contrasts the role of
science, especially civilian science, in the U.S. Naval Expedition to Japan and
the U.S. Naval Expedition to the North Pacific in the context of American
military-civilian scientific cooperation during that period. Special attention is
paid to the role of the Smithsonian Institution, the leading civilian scientific
institution in the United States, in the two naval expeditions.
IN THE EARLY l850s, the U.S. Navy launched
two major expeditions to the Pacific. These
were the U.S. Naval Expedition to Japan,
better known as the Perry Expedition, which
set sail in November 1852, and the U.S. Naval
Expedition to the North Pacific, also known
as the North Pacific Exploring Expedition
or the Ringgold/Rodgers Expeditions, which
departed the United States in June 1853. Al-
though both expeditions had scientific com-
ponents, the involvement of the Smithsonian
Institution, the leading American scientific
organization at the time, in the expeditions
was quite different. The Smithsonian played
a very peripheral role in the Perry Expedi-
tion, and then only after the expedition re-
turned. In contrast, the Smithsonian was
central to the North Pacific Exploring Expe-
dition throughout the expedition's existence.
In this paper I examine and compare these
contrasting roles in the context of American
military-civilian scientific cooperation during
that period.
Coincidently in 1853, the U.S. Army began
a series of important and successful surveys
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and scientific reconnaissances in the Ameri-
can West known as the Pacific Railroad Sur-
veys. The primary objective of these surveys
was to provide data to allow an informed
decision as to the route for the transconti-
nental railroad. These surveys were the cul-
mination of a number of pre-Civil War
expeditions conducted by the army in the
American West, including the Pacific coast.
The history of scientific exploration and
surveying by the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Navy is quite different (Goetzmann 1959,
1966, Kazar 1973, Ponko 1974). Civilian
scientists did not accompany the first major
army effort, the Lewis and Clark Expedition
of 1803-1805, which went from the Missis-
sippi River to the West Coast and back,
surveying and exploring the newly acquired
Louisiana Territory, but they were rela-
tively easily integrated into later expeditions.
Working relationships between civilian sci-
entists and survey commanders, although not
perfect, were relatively smooth and produc-
tive. For the most part, the collections gath-
ered by these expeditions had been small in
number and collected over a long period.
There had been few disputes. The scientists
accompanying the expeditions usually de-
scribed the specimens, having worked out the
issue of housing beforehand. Alternatively,
the commanding officer of an expedition
would send them to a particular scientist
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or scientific institution with whom he had
a personal relationship for description and
preservation.
In contrast, the navy started out with a
major exploring expedition-the U.S. South
Seas Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842,
better known as the Wilkes Expedition. Its
problems became legendary among American
scientists. Captain Charles Wilkes, the expedi-
tion's commander, was a firm believer in the
yet-unproven scientific abilities of naval offi-
cers. He reserved the physical sciences for
the military and reluctantly accepted civilian
scientists only when he was unable to find
qualified naturalists among the navy's medi-
cal corps. The relationship between the needs
of civilian scientists to collect and the naval
officers to survey had not been well thought
out. Wilkes always placed the needs of the
navy first (Stanton 1975, Viola and Margolis
1985).
Despite its problems, the Wilkes Expedi-
tion returned with thousands of specimens
from Australia, the West Coast of North
America, and the islands of the Pacific.
However, no provision had been made before
the departure of the expedition for the care
of the specimens, and they ultimately were
placed under the curatorship of the National
Institution for the Promotion of Science, a
local scientific society in Washington, D.C.,
with considerable political influence, but little
support among the national scientific com-
munity. The National Institution staff mis-
handled the collections, damaged or lost
specimens, and ignored the need to keep
specimens and identification labels together
(Kohlsted 1971, Viola and Margolis 1985).
Adding to the scientific community's un-
happiness, publication of the scientific results
of the U.S. Exploring Expedition was under
the control of Wilkes, who had his own ideas
about scientific research and publication,
ideas that conflicted with those of the scien-
tists. There were two decades of clashes be-
tween the scientists analyzing the specimens
and Wilkes over issues of format, use of
Latin, and the need for foreign scientific
input (Stanton 1975: 316-377, Hibler 1989).
When the Smithsonian Institution was es-
tablished in 1846, it was assumed by many
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that it would take responsibility for the
Wilkes specimens and other national collec-
tions housed in the Patent Office Building.
However, Joseph Henry, the first Secretary
(i.e., Director) of the Smithsonian, rejected
that assumption. He argued that maintaining
national collections, such as scientific speci-
mens returned by the military, was the finan-
cial responsibility of the government. The
Smithsonian would be free with its advice,
whether to government scientists, military
officers, or cabinet members; it would hap-
pily help train government scientists and
military officers conducting scientific collect-
ing. But at least some out-of-pocket costs
would have to be reimbursed (Reingold and
Rothenberg 1985).
This was no obstacle for working with the
army. For example, Henry and Jefferson
Davis, who had been a Regent (i.e., trustee)
of the Smithsonian before becoming Secre-
tary of War in 1853, had worked out an ar-
rangement for the Railroad Surveys in which
the Smithsonian would serve as a temporary
clearinghouse for the collections. The Smith-
sonian provided additional assistance to the
surveys: "The instruments have been com-
pared, implements constructed, and practical
instruction given in the art of observation
and the means of preserving specimens."
Secretary Henry congratulated himself on the
role of the Smithsonian in the exploration
and surveying of the American West: "it has
rendered important aid to physical geog-
raphy and natural history by the facilities
which it has afforded the several exploring
parties which have been fitted out during
the past year" (Smithsonian Institution
1853:24).
The relative success of the army and civil-
ian scientists to cooperate for the cause of
science can in part be credited to the training
and status of army officers in the United
States. During the first two-thirds of the
nineteenth century, an American army officer
could become a member of the scientific
community. If trained at the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point, which was founded
in 1803, such an officer would have had ex-
cellent technical training in mathematics and
practical astronomy. Many graduates had no
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expectations of a military career. Ulysses
S. Grant, destined to command the Union
forces during the Civil War, went to the
Military Academy in expectation of gain-
ing the qualifications for a professorship of
mathematics in a civilian college (Grant
1885: 40). Army officers could and did pursue
research, publish in scientific journals, and
get elected to learned societies such as the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Most of these officers were eventually as-
signed by the army to its elite Corps of
Topographical Engineers (Anonymous 1868,
Goetzman 1959).
Adding to the status of army officers,
alumni of the Military Academy held impor-
tant positions in the scientific community and
civilian life. For example, Alexander Dallas
Bache, class of 1825, was director of the U.S.
Coast Survey from 1843 until his death in
1867 and became the first president of the
National Academy of Sciences in 1863. One
of Bache's Military Academy classmates
was Jefferson Davis. Taking charge of the
survey of the northernmost route was Isaac I.
Stevens, the governor of Washington Terri-
tory, whom Henry described in a letter to
an English scientist (Henry 1853a) as both
"a graduate of West Point" and "much
interested in the promotion of science."
The situation was much different for naval
officers. Even as late as 1853, most naval offi-
cers were the products of a shipboard ap-
prentice system. Those who went to the naval
equivalent of the Military Academy were few
and poorly trained. The naval academy at
Annapolis was not established until 1845,
and it did not provide a four-year curriculum
equivalent to that of the Military Academy
until 1850-1851. Because science was not
held in high regard at the naval academy, the
scientific training offered there was inferior to
its army counterpart (Bruce 1988: 161, 209,
Ponko 1974: 15-16).
These differences between the army and
the navy did not result in the complete ab-
sence of naval officers in the scientific com-
munity. Naval officers could receive scientific
training before 1845 by taking a leave of
absence to attend college or be tutored by
a scientist (Davis 1899, Ponko 1974: 15).
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Another alternative was duty with the U.S.
Coast Survey. Although a civilian agency,
the Coast Survey utilized naval personnel,
providing them with training in hydrography
and geodesy (Bruce 1988: 172). That these
alternatives worked for highly motivated in-
dividuals is indicated by the parity between
active army officers and active naval officers
among the 50 founders of the National
Academy of Sciences. There were four of
each (in addition to two former army officers
and three civilian employees of the navy).
However, it required considerably more ini-
tiative for a naval officer to become actively
involved in science. One consequence of these
circumstances was that some of the naval
officers most committed to raising the level
of scientific expertise in their service felt the
need to prove to the civilian community that
they could do science without civilian assis-
tance (Dupree 1986: 97). Others, however,
felt comfortable with a partnership in which
the navy was subordinate to civilian scien-
tists. The commanders of the Perry and
North Pacific Exploring Expeditions took
these opposing approaches.
THE PERRY EXPEDITION
On 24 November 1852, Commodore
Matthew C. Perry, the recently appointed
commander of the East India Squadron, set
sail from Norfolk, Virginia. The primary
mission of his expedition was the opening
of Japan to American trade. A secondary
mission was the advancement of scientific
knowledge.
Science was not supposed to be incidental
to the mission. Indeed, it has even been sug-
gested that one of the reasons Perry was
selected for the command was his sympathy
for science. During the Mexican War he had
collected natural history specimens (Kazar
1973: 158). Yet science turned out to be very
peripheral to this expedition. In part at least,
this was due to Perry's desire to prove that
naval officers were just as capable of doing
science as West Point graduates. He fought
every suggestion to have civilian scientists
accompany his expedition and bragged about
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it to his officers (Perry 1968: 9). In the end,
the only civilian component of the scientific
side of the expedition was James Morrow, an
agriculturalist employed by the State De-
partment, but he was not a research scientist.
Collecting and observing in geology, ethnol-
ogy, zoology, and botany was to be done by
naval officers, supplemented by the two naval
surgeons who accompanied the expedition
and the naval chaplain.
The experiences of the chaplain, George
Jones, provide insight into the status of sci-
ence on the Perry Expedition. Jones was offi-
cially the expedition's geologist, although
he had not studied geology in the 30 years
since he had graduated from Yale in 1823
(Rothenberg 1974: 90). In any case, Jones got
sidetracked after a conversation with James
Dana, the professor of geology at Yale. He
took up Dana's suggestion that he "would
have good opportunities for observations
on the Zodiacal Light" (Jones 1856: ix). The
zodiacal light became his passion, despite a
lack of training and preparation. Jones' only
equipment was "a nine-inch-celestial globe";
his library was restricted to "an odd number
of the American Journal of Science, contain-
ing some remarks by Professor Olmsted ...
and two of Nichol's works on Astronomy"
(Jones 1856: x).
The third volume of Perry's report con-
sisted of 340 plates showing Jones' obser-
vations. Jones also developed a theory of
zodiacal light that he first published in the
American Journal of Science. He argued that
the light was caused by a "nebulous ring with
the earth for its centre, and lying within
the orbit of the moon" (Jones 1855: 139).
The theory was extremely controversial. Al-
though some Americans applauded his work,
Europeans were more skeptical. Piazzi Smyth
claimed that "Jones had never seen the zodi-
acallight at all" (Anonymous 1870: 285).
Jones' lack of training and lack of prepa-
ration was the norm for the expedition. The
naval officers were not up to the respon-
sibilities placed upon them. Fortunately,
Morrow proved to be a good collector and
came back with excellent collections of rep-
tiles and plants.With the return of the Perry
Expedition in l855,came the same question
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that had to be answered for the Wilkes Ex-
pedition: how were expedition collections to
be described and by whom? Perry decided on
a modification of the Wilkes model. He
wanted to include the scientific findings in
his narrative, with Chaplain Jones providing
oversight. Jones, however, was only inter-
ested in his zodiacal light observations. The
collections were eventually farmed out to
specialists for description: four botanists,
including Asa Gray; the ichthyologist J.
Carson Brevoort; and the ornithologist John
Cassin. There were clashes between Perry
and the scientists over the time necessary to
analyze the collections properly, as well as
over Perry's desire to publish the results in his
narrative report versus the scientists' desires
to publish in scientific journals. The State
Department and the navy had jurisdictional
disputes over the collections. The scientists
complained that the lack of trained collectors
resulted in insufficient information about the
collections. Overall, the contribution to sci-
ence by the Perry Expedition was limited
(Kazar 1973, Ponko 1974).
The Smithsonian's role was also limited.
When the expedition returned, Henry offered
the assistance of the Smithsonian, an offer
Perry apparently accepted. However, the
extent of that assistance is uncertain. All that
is known for sure is that some of the Perry
collections did come to the Smithsonian
(Smithsonian Institution 1858).
THE NORTH PACIFIC EXPLORING EXPEDITION
The North Pacific Exploring Expedition
was a surveying and exploring expedition. Its
objective was the increase of knowledge. The
political justification was the need of Ameri-
can whalers and ships engaged in the China
trade to have accurate surveys of the North
Pacific Ocean, the Bering Straits, and the
China Sea. But its officers were also expected
"to combine with its primary nautical aspect
as much exploration in the field of natural
History as the opportunities of the cruise
might allow" (ponko 1974: 207). Initially led
by Lt. Cadwalader Ringgold, a veteran of
the Wilkes Expedition, the North Pacific Ex-
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ploring Expedition was supposed to demon-
strate what the navy and the nation had
learned from the earlier venture to the Pacific.
Neither Ringgold, removed from command
in 1854 after a mental breakdown, nor his
second in command (and ultimate successor)
Lt. John Rodgers, nor Secretary of the Navy
William Graham were insecure about the
navy's ability to further the cause of science.
They would cooperate with civilian scientists,
much as the army did.
In fact, the navy's approach to civilian
science in the Ringgold Expedition was simi-
lar to the army's approach in the Pacific
Railroad Surveys. Initially, the navy worked
closely with the Smithsonian, as representa-
tive of the American scientific community, in
the selection of scientists to accompany the
expedition, the distribution of collections, the
selection of the reference library, and publi-
cation plans. The Smithsonian would serve
as the scientific clearinghouse. It agreed to
"take charge" of the collections, "see to their
preservation, and if thought necessary, will
procure scientific descriptions which will en-
able an account of them to be published as
soon as the expedition returns." It was un-
derstood, however, that the navy agreed to
defray the expenses of the Smithsonian
(Henry 1853b).
A dozen civilian scientists were taken on
the expedition, backed by another dozen back
in the United States. Leading the scientific
contingent on board was Charles Wright,
Asa Gray's assistant and the most experi-
enced botanical collector in the United States.
Also on board was William Stimson, then an
assistant to Louis Agassiz and destined to
become a leading invertebrate zoologist.
All of this was orchestrated with Secretary
of the Navy Graham and his successor, John
Pendleton Kennedy. But by the time the first
scientific collections were returned in late
1853, a presidential election had occurred,
and a different political party was in power.
Yet a third Secretary of the Navy was in
charge, James C. Dobbin, a Democrat, re-
placing his Whig predecessors. The careful
arrangements made for the North Pacific
Exploring Expedition were threatened. The
problem arose when Henry asked for the
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funds when the first specimens came back:
"Three cases of specimens of natural history,
sent home by the exploring expedition under
the charge of Capt. Ringgold, have been re-
ceived at this Institution. They are accom-
panied with the request that they may be ex-
amined and put in a condition for permanent
preservation and scientific description.... We
have however been informed that the sum of
one thousand dollars, was set aside out of
the appropriation made by Congress for the
expedition, to meet the expenses above men-
tioned, and I write to ask whether the Insti-
tution can draw on the Navy Department
for the expenditures on account of the speci-
mens, and if so, what forms are to be ob-
served" (Henry 1853b).
Henry was shocked by Dobbin's reply:
"that it was not the intention of the Navy
Department that the specimens should be
sent to the Smithsonian Institution, Com-
mander Ringgold having been directed to
send all such .specimens to the Navy Depart-
ment to be disposed of in a suitable manner"
(Dobbin 1853). He wanted the specimens
back in the hands of the navy. Henry fired
back: "In reply I beg respectfully to state in
explanation of my previous letter, that there
has been some mistake either on the part of
the Smithsonian Institutiorr, or the Navy
Department with regard to this matter. The
Smithsonian Institution does not desire these
specimens on its own account. It however
desires as far as possible with its limited
means to promote every branch of knowl-
edge, and in no case has it refused to render
the government any aid which might be re-
quired in this line." Henry then reviewed the
relationship between the North Pacific Expe-
dition and the Smithsonian, repeatedly dis-
avowed any desire to keep the collections on
a permanent basis, and then subtly reminded
Dobbin of what had gone wrong with the
Wilkes Expedition: "In behalf of the science
of the country I beg leave to add that unless
the specimens are properly preserved by per-
sons well skilled in operations of this kind,
they will be destroyed before the return of the
expedition. If after this exposition of facts
you still desire the return of the specimens, or
if there be no funds appropriated to defray
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the necessary expenses, I will direct Prof.
Baird to send the boxes to the Navy Depart-
ment" (Henry 1853c).
While Henry and Dobbin exchanged let-
ters, the Smithsonian went to Kennedy for
support. He in tum wrote Dobbin, reiterating
the curatorial failures of the National Insti-
tute, highlighting the help the Smithsonian
had already supplied to the navy, and argu-
ing that utilizing the Smithsonian was in the
best interest of the nation, even though such
an arrangement was not explicitly included in
the bill authorizing the expedition (Kazar
1973: 206-207). Dobbin capitulated and
wrote Henry that the navy would "avail itself
of the skill and science of the Smithsonian"
for the care and preservation of the speci-
mens, providing funds until "circumstances
may constrain me to abandon the effort"
(Dobbin 1854).
Yet the expedition faced rough times
ahead. Congress lost interest in the expedi-
tion as sectional politics loomed larger and
larger in the American consciousness. Rod-
gers was frustrated in his efforts to obtain
sufficient funding to publish the results in an
expedition series before the Civil War's out-
break in 1861. With the coming of war, the
publication was abandoned. The expedition
was also haunted by extreme bad luck. Stim-
son lost most of the collections in the great
Chicago fire of 1871.
Yet by combining the strengths of the
Smithsonian and the civilian scientific com-
munity with that of the navy, the North
Pacific Exploring Expedition was able to
make major contributions to science. Speci-
mens of over 5000 species of fauna and
thousands of plant species were collected and
returned to the Smithsonian, to be analyzed
by a variety of scientists whose results ap-
peared in the journal literature (Smithsonian
Institution 1856).
The most important result of the expedi-
tion lay in its contribution to the work of
Asa Gray on the geographical distribution of
plant species, based on Charles Wright's field
notes. In tum, this material was incorporated
by Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species
(Dupree 1968: 233-263). However, the North
Pacific Exploring Expedition was also one of
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the principal factors in the creation of the U.S.
National Museum. Thanks to that expedi-
tion, and the concurrent Railroad Surveys,
the number of scientific specimens belonging
to the government increased some four-fold.
The quantity and quality of these specimens
persuaded Joseph Henry to work with the
government to establish a publicly funded
national museum in the United States, the
forerunner of the Smithsonian museum com-
plex that sits today on The Mall in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Reingold and Rothenberg 1985).
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